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Abstract. The project aims at developing new photonic transmitters for quantum
cryptography applications which could be used to increase the security of
communication networks. The transmitter will be designed to generate security keys
at a speed up to 100 Mb/s, two orders of magnitude larger than the state-of-the-art
sources. The whole transmitter, with the optical and electronic parts integrated, will
have a reduced size and power consumption. In addition, space-qualified optoelectronic
devices will be used, so that the final prototype will be ready for satellites and future
European Space Agency (ESA) missions.
1. Introduction
The transmission, storage and processing of information is the basis of the current
world and its impact on our lives is evident in almost all our daily activities. This
has been possible thanks to the introduction of new technology (wireless and optical
networks) with key components coming from micro-electronics and photonics. With the
establishment of these means, the transmission of information is open to the possibility
of the existence of intruders whose purpose is to gain undesired knowledge of the
information being transmitted, thus turning the system into an insecure channel for
the transmission of confidential data.
Cryptography is the art of interpreting a coded message that only desired receivers
are authorized to access. Different methods of encryption, currently used, require that
two parties which wish to transmit information securely need to exchange one or more
keys. Once the keys have been exchanged, the information can be transferred to a known
level of security. Therefore, the security in transmissions is based exclusively on the
security in the key exchange. The surest way to make this key exchange is face-to-face,
but this is not possible in most cases because of the multiple number of partners with
whom is wished to exchange such information (banks, hospitals, on-line shopping, co
working in remote locations, military,...). Quantum cryptography guarantees absolute
confidentiality of the transmitted information based on the principles of quantum
physics. The key is formed by quantum states of a particle (photon, electron,...), called
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qubits. For example, qubits can be created using properties such as the polarization
or the phase of a photon. Quantum physics can guarantee that any hearing of the
encrypted information (keys) can be detected immediately, due to the fundamental
quantum principle that you can not measure or reproduce the state (eg. polarization or
phase) of a photon without being detected [1].
Bennett and Brassard were the first to introduce a quantum key distribution (QKD)
scheme, which uses communication over a - completely insecure - quantum channel,
in addition to the classical channel. This scheme is commonly known as the BB84
protocol [2]. Although single photon sources may well be very useful for quantum
computing, they are not required for QKD. Currently single photon sources are rather
impractical for QKD. Instead, attenuated laser pulses or faint pulse sources (FPS), which
in average emit less than one photon per pulse, are often used as signals in practical
QKD devices. Furthermore, the significant performance limitations of attenuated pulse
systems has led to belief that single photon sources would be indispensable for building
efficient QKD systems. However, the decoy state method, which is described in [3, 4],
allows for a much tighter bound for the key generation rate, achieving an almost linear
dependency of the latter on the channel transmittance. In this way, the technologically
much simpler attenuated pulse systems are again on a level with systems based on single
photon sources.
The project aims at developing new photonic transmitters for quantum
cryptography applications which could be used to increase the security of communication
networks. The transmitter will be designed to generate security keys at a speed up to
100 Mb/s, two orders of magnitude larger than the state-of-the-art sources. The core of
the transmitter will be a photon FPS which combines an amplitude and a polarization
or a phase modulation of the optic signal. The whole transmitter, with the optical
and electronic parts integrated, will have a reduced size and power consumption. In
addition, space-qualified optoelectronic devices will be used, so that the final prototype
will be ready for satellites and future European Space Agency (ESA) missions. The
projects also aims at developing a source which enables to combine secure networks
in fiber and in free space to contribute to a global secure network based in quantum
cryptography, currently limited to a 100 Km [5, 6]. The specific objective of this work
is to characterize the initial design of a photon FPS which can generate, in a random
operation with a 100 MHz bit rate, three energy levels which at the end will be largely
attenuated (for example 1/2, 1/8 and 0 photons per pulse at the output of the source)
and four polarization states (eg. lineal 45◦and -45◦, and circular right and left).
In Section 2, a brief description of the basic theory and state-of-the-art of FPS is
reviewed. In Section 3, the general design concept of the proposed FPS is presented.
In Section 4, some relevant results are shown and analyzed. In Section 5, conclusions
reached in this work are drawn, as well as a description of its novelties and proposals
for future work are formulated.
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2. Theory and state-of-the-art
2.1. Faint pulse sources (Attenuated pulse systems)
Alice encodes the bits to be distributed using pulses in two orthogonal states to encode
a 0 and 1, respectively. To prevent the possible intrusion, the number of photons per
pulse must be limited to a value much lower than unity (typically 1/2 photons per
pulse). The encoding base is changed randomly between two bases (eg. linear 45◦and
-45◦, and circular right and left) so that about half the number of pulses sent are
encoded using each one of them. In the receiver (Bob) uses single photon detectors to
detect light pulses converting them into electronic pulses for classical processing of the
received information. The two states are separated by a splitter and 0 or 1 are received
depending on the state detected. Previously, a switch is used to randomize the basis
of measurement. Since at the beginning of the link the pulses are strongly attenuated
and due to the attenuation loss of the link, only a very small number of pulses sent
by the transmitter will be detected at the receiver. The receiver keeps in any case the
record of the events generated in the detection and at the end of the transmission, or
over the transmission, the two parties distill the information shared by the two entities,
over a public channel. All pulses lost in transmission, as well as those detected with the
incorrect base are discarded and thus are removed from the registers that keep Alice
and Bob, respectively. In this way, both transmitter and receiver share the same key,
in principle. The errors that appear when comparing the two is due to the presence of
intruders or imperfections of the channel. Below a threshold, the errors can be corrected
and any information withheld by the intruder is erased using a privacy amplification
process [7].
2.2. Polarization encoding
To encode the qubits in the polarization of a photon is very intuitive. In fact, the
first experimental demonstration of quantum key distribution of Bennett and Brassard
in 1984 (BB84) was done using this technique. The experiment consisted of a system
where Alice (the sender) and Bob (the receiver) exchanged very weak pulses of light
generated from a light emitting diode containing in average less than one photon per
pulse, transmitted in free space over a distance of 30 cm.
Most of these systems implement a BB84 protocol type that has already been
described above. In the case of free space applications it is better to encode information
in the polarization of the photon. While, in fiber applications it is more suited to encode
information in the phase, since optical fibers introduce an uncontrollable polarization
rotation for long distances.
2.3. Decoy state protocol
Quantum mechanics guarantees 100% security in the case of single-photon sources,
while in the case of more practical sources such as FPS, the security is not implicitly
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guaranteed against an external attack, especially if the transmission line has significant
losses. Recently, the introduction of the decoy state protocol has helped to keep enjoying
unconditional security offered by quantum mechanics, as well as to increase the distance
between the transmitter and receiver with respect to other protocols [8] using sources
of weak photon pulses.
The basic idea of the decoy state protocol is as follows [3]. Assuming that Alice
can prepare coherent states with random polarization or phase, and that it is possible
to change the intensity of each signal independently and equally random. In this way,
it is possible to introduce decoy states with a different number of average photons per
pulse mixed randomly with the signal states. As the only way to distinguish a signal
state from a decoy state is in the distribution of the number of photons, the attack can
only be based on the photon number splitting attack (PNS) [10–12]. Computing the
number of events detected, in a public way, and the error rate in each state, one can
detect a possible eavesdropper (intruder). The idea is as if many events are detected for
the excess number of photons pulses, while very few events for the non-excess number
of photon pulses, the line is likely to suffer an attack. Thus, it becomes clear that the
decoy state protocol is only designed to detect attacks and is added as a complement to
other protocols (polarization or phase encoding belongs to the two bases of the BB84
protocol).
2.4. State-of-the-art
Until now, basically, quantum key distribution solutions using a decoy state protocol has
been based in four laser diodes, each one being independently modulated and polarized
within one of the four states (0o, 45o, 90o, 135o). Then, the output of each of the four
laser diodes is coupled to a common launching interface, being either a telescope for free
space applications, or an optical fiber for telecommunication optical fibers applications.
Such solutions imply some problems and limitations. The temporal and spectral shape
of each pulse emitted by a laser diode depends on the current and temperature, changing
largely from laser to laser. This variation makes it inviable to generate four pulses with
the same temporal and spectral shape, lowering the security in the quantum transmission
of the key. Adjusting the current and the temperature for each laser diode is one of
the ways to level off the emitted pulses by the four lasers. This method does not
totally guarantee a sufficient similarity, even with pre-selection of the lasers. Thus, the
economical cost of the device is high. Direct modulation of lasers in order to generate
the pulses limits the modulation speed down to about 10Mb/s. Due to the fact that
is difficult to modulate at higher frequencies while keeping a certain degree of spectral
and temporal equality of the pulses. Moreover, lasers undergo a constant process of
change of their properties, known as aging, and this can reach to a point where it is
not possible to compensate this differences with the control parameters (current and
temperature), making it even more difficult to achieve similarity of the temporal and
spectral shapes. Each laser has to generate different levels of energy per pulse (1/2, 1/8
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and 0 photons per pulse at the output of the source) and this is achieved changing the
current. Intrinsically, the variation of energy due to the variation of the current is a
non-linear process, thus implies that the temporal and spectral shape of the generated
pulses by each laser is not the same. Moreover, when the current in the laser is changed
not only the optical emitted energy (intensity of the electromagnetic wave) changes but
also the phase of the latter, introducing a non-controllable parameter which is going to
change the temporal and spectral shape of the pulses. Newer schemes allow to overcome
these limitations mentioned above, but still the key generation rate is in the order of
few Mb/s [13].
3. Design concept
In this project it is proposed to develop a faint pulse photon source implementing the
decoy state protocol. A single laser diode emitting pulses at 100MHz followed by an
amplitude and a polarization modulator integrated with fiber input and output. The
modulators can operate at modulations higher than 1 Gb/s with very low voltages,
around 1.5 V to 3 V and 800 nm to 1550 nm. The use of a single laser diode and
modulators ensures the similarity (indistinguishability) of the pulses from a temporal
and spectral point of view. In Figure 1 is shown the scheme of the source.
PMF
PMF Amplitude modulator
Polarization modulator
Laser diode
PMF
PMFSMF100 MHz / 1 ns
1/2 1/80 0
Electric signal
Electrical signal
Output pulses with modulated
number of photons and
polarization state
1/2
1/8
0
0
Figure 1: Design scheme.
The laser is directly modulated to generate a train of pulses of constant energy.
This prevents the mentioned problem of differences between different pulses due to non-
linearity of the electro-optical characteristic of the laser. The same train of pulses is
guided through a polarization maintaining fiber (PMF) to an amplitude modulator (eg.
a Mach-Zehnder modulator in LiNbO3) that will generate the three different levels of
energy at random. Next, these pulses will enter a polarization modulator that generates
the states of polarization. Actually, the polarization modulator is a phase modulator
in LiNbO3 waveguide with an input of 45
◦with respect to the optical axis. In this way
the two components of the electromagnetic field that propagates in the crystal have
different refractive index, which depend on the applied electric field (proportional to the
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Table 1: Relevant temporal and spectral parameters of the generated electrical pulses.
Output Pulse width [ns] Max. RF current [mA] Fall time [ps] Rise time [ps]
Monitor with LD 1.49 −52 200 500
voltage applied to the modulator), to get the four states of polarization, linear +45◦,
-45◦, circular right and circular left.
4. Results
4.1. Electrical pulses
The electrical time and spectrum measurements of the laser current driver monitor
output, with the laser diode loaded to the driver output, are shown in Figure 2. The
parasitic inductance due to the leads of the laser diode cause some degradation of the
signal, including ringing. Therefore, it is needed custom electronics with particular time
and spectral characteristics to match the laser diode which is wanted to drive.
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Figure 2: Laser diode driver pulses at 100MHz with laser diode.
Table 1 summarizes the relevant temporal and spectral parameters of the electrical
driving pulses. The obtained values can be considered as acceptable for the final
electronic integration of the FPS.
4.2. Optical pulses
In Figure 3 is shown the generated CW train of optical pulses in time and the optical
spectrum. Notice the acceptable temporal and spectral shape of the optical pulses,
showing that it is possible to generate optical pulses at 100 MHz.
Table 2 summarizes the relevant temporal and spectral parameters of the optical
generated pulses. The small optical pulse width is a good characteristic since the
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Figure 3: Optical time and spectrum shapes of the laser output.
Table 2: Relevant temporal and spectral parameters of the generated optical pulses.
Pulse width [ps] Max. intensity [mW] Rise time [ps] Fall time [ps] Spectrum bandwidth [nm]
400 6 65 129 < 0.131nm
measurement window in the Bob receiver will be smaller and thus a better signal to
noise ratio will be achieved. Furthermore, the optical pulse bandwidth, generated with
the laser diode used for this source, is small enough to enter the acceptance bandwidth
of the polarization modulator, computed to be around 0.1nm.
4.3. Random 3 and 4 levels driving electrical pulses
In Figure 4 are shown the three and four different levels of electrical pulses at 100MHz,
in order to drive the amplitude modulator and the polarization modulator, respectively.
It is demonstrated the possibility of generating 3 and 4 different driving pulse levels at
100MHz.
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Figure 4: Different pulse levels at 100MHz using the modulators drivers.
Initial design of a faint pulse photon source for quantum key distribution 8
Table 3: Relevant parameters of the AM driver’s RF square pulse driving signal to the AM.
Pulse DC bias [V] Square pulse amplitude (p-p) [mV] Square pulse offset [mV]
High energy level 0.5 0 0
Medium energy level 0.5 400 200
Low energy level 0.5 600 400
4.4. Amplitude modulator
The three optical pulses generated with the amplitude modulator (AM) are shown in
Figure 5. Notice that around 6dB of extinction ratio is achieved for medium energy
pulse and 30dB of extinction ratio for the low energy pulse, both relative to the high
energy pulse. Thus, being able to implement the different energy pulses needed for the
decoy state protocol.
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Figure 5: Optical time and spectrum shapes of the amplitude modulator outputs.
Table 3 summarizes the driving voltages to the AM generated with the AM driver.
Notice the low driving voltages needed, which are suitable for the electronic integration
of the source.
4.5. Polarization modulator
The temporal and spectral shape of the four optical pulses with different polarizations
are shown in Figure 6, while in Figure 7 are shown the respective four polarization states
generated with the polarization modulator (PM).
Table 4 summarizes the driving voltages of the polarization modulator generated
with the PM driver, as well as the degree of polarization (D.O.P.) for each polarization
state. Again, notice the low driving voltages needed, which are suitable for the electronic
integration of the source. While the values of the D.O.P. need to be improved, for a
better quantum bit error rate QBER.
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Figure 6: Optical time and spectrum shapes of the polarization modulator outputs.
Figure 7: Different polarizations on the Poincare sphere, measured with a polarimeter.
Table 4: Relevant parameters of the PM driver’s RF square pulse driving signal to the PM.
Polarization Square pulse amplitude (p-p) [mV] Square pulse offset [mV] D.O.P.
+45◦ 0 0 75.125%
Circular right 700 350 73.423%
-45◦ 1400 700 79.084%
Circular left −700 −350 74.948%
5. Conclusions
The proposed FPS implements the decoy state protocol in a BB84 scheme, using a single
laser diode emitting pulses at 100MHz followed by an amplitude and a polarization
modulator integrated with fiber input and output. The use of a single laser diode
and two modulators ensures the similarity (indistinguishability) of the pulses from a
temporal and spectral point of view. Secondly, it will be aimed at obtaining a system
with low power consumption, reduced size and qualified devices for terrestrial optical
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fiber and free-space satellite communications. Finally, this versatile FPS design which
could enable a global quantum cryptography system, combining free-space and optical
fiber transmission, will overcome the current transmission limit in length (about 100
Km in optical fiber).
While performing this study, several aspects that will require further investigation
have been identified, including the possibility to directly pulse the laser diode at
different currents, with custom driving electronics, to reduce the complexity and power
consumption of the source while keeping a reasonable indistinguishability of the different
pulses. Also, it is planned to increase the key rate either by means of higher pulse
generation rates or by implementing more efficient QKD protocols. At the same time,
it will be pursued to reduce the cost and power consumption of the source.
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